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Abstract 
We analyze the determinants of default and prepayment in the Turkish mortgage market by 
utilizing data obtained from a large commercial bank. Our main findings suggest that default is 
positively affected by a high loan to value ratio and term length of mortgages, and negatively affected 
by certain quantitative easing periods, good expectations regarding the future, the ratio of real house 
prices to the size of the economy and mortgage customer’s high school and above level of education 
and being married. The probability of prepayment rises with the increase in variables such as the gain 
ratio due to prepayment, high school and above level of education of the mortgage customer, size of 
the GDP and the ratio of real house prices to GDP. We also find that the likelihoods of both the cases 
of default and prepayment are locally maximized when nearly 60% of the term is reached. 
Keywords : Mortgage, Default, Prepayment, Dynamic Analysis, Logistic 
Regression. 
JEL Classification Codes : C33, E44, G21. 
Öz 
Bu çalışmada, Türkiye mortgage piyasasındaki temerrüt ve erken ödemelerin belirleyicileri, 
ticari bir bankadan temin edilen veriler kullanılarak, analiz edilmektedir. Temel bulgularımız 
göstermektedir ki; borç-değer rasyosunun ve mortgage kredisi vadesinin yükselmesi temerrüt 
olasılığını arttırıcı etkide bulunmaktayken, bu olasılığı azaltıcı temel etkenler ise bazı parasal 
genişleme dönemleri, geleceğe dair iyi beklentiler, reel konut fiyatlarının ekonomik büyüklüğe oranı 
ve mortgage kredisi müşterisinin lise ve üstü eğitim seviyesine sahip ve evli olmasıdır. Erken ödeme 
olasılığı ise erken ödemeden kaynaklı kazanç oranı, mortgage müşterisinin lise ve üstü eğitim düzeyi, 
GSYH büyüklüğü ve reel konut fiyatlarının GSYH’ye oranı değişkenlerindeki artış ile yükselmektedir. 
Makalede ayrıca, vadenin yaklaşık %60’ına ulaşıldığında hem temerrüt hem de erken ödeme 
olasılıklarının en üst düzeye çıktığı bulunmuştur. 
Anahtar Sözcükler : Mortgage Kredisi, Temerrüt, Erken Ödeme, Dinamik Analiz, Lojistik 
Regresyon. 
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The question of what drives prepayment and default behaviours of mortgage 
customers has remained significant to comprehend the structure of financial markets and 
household attitudes. Without any consumer debt, many household or people could not afford 
to own a house. Therefore, mortgage loans have potential to offer customers the opportunity 
to purchase house by managing their regular income well. Rationally, to ensure long-term 
life cycle, transfer from future resources to pay for current consumption, customers and 
financial intermediaries must appropriately manage their borrowings (debts) and lending 
(loans) operations. Excessive debt or easy lending might result in economic and social 
frustration. There are also links between the markets for consumption goods and housing 
that directly affects liquidity considerations for mortgage markets. 
Mortgage contracts cover some significant characteristics; interest rates, maturity, 
housing price, income et al. Besides these factors, mortgage contracts or debts might also 
influence social aspects of households such as marriage satisfaction. For instance, according 
to the National Survey of Families and Households data from USA, any dramatic change in 
consumer loan debt can predict changes in marital satisfaction of couples (Xiao, 2015). This 
issue has also been related with customer culture and might vary across countries. Hence, 
country based empirical studies, like ours, might shed light on country or cultural 
differences. 
On the mortgage creditors side, the main question, perhaps the most significant, is 
how to handle or identify potential defaulters. It can be also claimed that mortgage or loan 
issuers have less incentive or signals to identify possible defaulters in a way related to 
lending standards. A loose filtering process or lender-friendly loan evaluation procedure 
might increase the number of defaulters whereas a strict filtering process might narrow 
mortgage demand. 
The probability of default and prepayments might appear to be influenced by 
different set of customer and macroeconomic specific factors such as marriage status, 
income level, occupation, age, lenght of mortgage contract term, housing prices, interest 
rates, income shocks et al. (LaCour-Little, 2008; Doviak & MacDonald, 2012). In general, 
studies focusing on default and prepayment behaviors use three known variables in their 
regression analyses: loan to value (LTV), loan to income (LTI) and mortgage payment to 
income (MTI) ratios. It is also a known fact that wage-indexed mortgage payment might 
better protect borrowers compared to the nominal mortgage contractor (Campbell & Cocco, 
2012). Many other variables can be added to either list depending on other conditions. 
Another important point related to default or prepayment attitudes is whether it was made 
strategically or out of necessity. Sometimes borrowers may strategically choose not to repay 
debts, even if they can afford to do so, which is called as strategic default since borrowers 
use complex contracts as strategically and choose to default whenever it is profitable 
(Wyman, 2010). Based on literature review, we examine and interpret our analysis into two 
categories: Defaults and prepayments. 
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In our case, there are no studies examining the conditional probabilities and 
determinants of defaults and prepayments on mortgage contracts in Turkey. Some 
quantitative and qualitative models focusing on customer history, income, credit scoring and 
occupation can not provide sufficient and required information. The present empirical 
research is a step to fill this gap and the Turkish commercial banks may benefit by integrating 
these results with their internal default predictions or credit-risk scoring. 
In this context, by using the data from large commercial private bank Garanti, we 
attempt to analyse the determinants of defaults and prepayments in the Turkish mortgage 
market which has experienced a rapid expansion over last decade. We use data from a large 
commercial bank’s mortgage contracts that were introduced on March 2007 in Turkey and 
quickly replaced with regular housing credits. The individual level mortgage data covers the 
period between June 2007 and January 2014. Briefly and generally, we find that the 
probability of default rises with the loan to value ratio and it is less likely for a borrower to 
default at the initial and final months of payment. In other words, the likelihood of default 
is locally maximized when 62% of the term (74th month for a 120-month contract) is 
reached. The term length of the contract, expectations about house prices and education 
affect the probability of default. 
This empirical paper proceeds as follows: The next section reviews the literature on 
defaults and prepayments behaviours. We present the data and model in section 3. We 
discuss the empirical methodology in section 4 and the estimation results in section 5. The 
last section concludes the paper. 
2. Literaure Review 
Multiple studies examine the factors behind default and prepayment attitudes. The 
literature can be grouped based on several categorizations. It can be classified based on 
whether the focus is on defaults or prepayments. An alternative categorization can be made 
based on how much control the borrower has over default and prepayment decisions, i.e. 
depending on whether the decision was made strategically or out of necessity. Opportunities 
would be presented by the changing market conditions, interest rates, real house prices, 
macroeconomic conditions and international dynamics. Constraints are imposed by 
household income, marriage, age, unemployment, house equity, loan-to-value ratio. Many 
other variables can be added to either list depending on other conditions. These two 
categories need not be mutually exclusive; often variables pertaining to both explanations 
would be included in regressions. It is the relative emphasis put on them that merits 
categorization. Our study represents the first of the kind for the Turkish market. Therefore, 
it inevitably maintains an exploratory nature while performing formal causal analyses. 
For instance, LaCour-Little (2008) presents theoretical and empirical evidence on 
mortgage defaults, specifically focusing on termination risks that are directly linked to 
economic factors. Besides the economic factors, Wyman (2010) and Guiso and Sodini 
(2012) differentiate between strategic default and economic default. According to them, 
some borrowers strategically choose to discontinue payments despite being able to afford 
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them. This is called strategic default. In our Turkish mortgage case, we do not differentiate 
between economic and strategic default. 
The effect of loan restructuring on default and prepayment are observed by a number 
of studies. The fact that wealth motives tend to be an important determinant of default 
decisions at high levels of negative equity is consistent with the empirical findings of 
Haughwout et al. (2016). They find that the re-default rate declines relatively more when 
payment reduction is achieved through principal forgiveness as compared to lower interest 
rates. The empirical analysis of Doviak and MacDonald (2012) also emphasizes the role of 
modifications that reduce loan balances in preventing default. Mortgage refinancing is 
shown by Chen et al. (2013) to play an important role in consumption smoothing, suggesting 
there are links within the market for consumption goods and housing. Elul et al. (2010) 
provides empirical evidence on the importance of liquidity considerations for mortgage 
default decisions. 
Regarding country analyses, most studies examine the US and UK markets since 
these countries have financial deepening mortgage markets and any extra default risk 
regarding the mortgage market triggers the crisis scenarios. For example, Mian and Sufi 
(2009) studies the sharp increase in mortgage defaults in the US market before the 2008 
financial crisis. Based on mortgage level ZIP code analyses, they find that mortgage credit 
expansion rapidly grew between 2002 and 2005 despite sharply declining relative to income 
growth. In other words, income and mortgage credit growth move into opposite directions. 
Using data from US States, Ghent and Kudlyak (2011) analyse default behaviours of 
mortgage lenders and show that borrowers are 30% more likely to default in non-recourse 
states. They reveal that lender-friendly loan evaluation procedures increase the probability 
of default. 
There are very few studies examining default and prepayment behaviours in 
emerging economies and Turkey. In most of studies on mortgage defaults, three main 
variables are used. First is the loan to value (LTV) ratio where loan is the total amount of 
borrowing used in financing the property and value represents its concurrent market price. 
The second is the loan to income (LTI) ratio where income is a measure of household 
earnings for a period, usually year or month. The third is the mortgage payment to income 
(MTI) ratio where the mortgage payment refers to the periodic deposit made to the bank 
toward the mortgage loan and income is the household earnings within the same period. For 
instance, Erol and Patel (2005) uses wage-indexed payment mortgage data and finds that 
wage-indexed mortgage payment protects the borrower while nominal mortgage contracts 
might result in higher mortgage default in Turkey. 
Ambrose and Sanders (2003) do not find any relationship between 
default/prepayment and LTV. Schwartz and Torous (2003) have found that the age of the 
mortgage plays an important role in regressions aimed at explaining default rates. Kang and 
Zenios (1992) use basis functions to capture the complex interactions between interest rate 
differentials and prepayment rates in their calibrations. Kalotay et al. (2004) argue that the 
market value of a mortgage should be emphasized rather than future payments. Navratil 
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(1985) uses the difference between the prevailing market rate and the contract rate. The 
relationship is most elastic when the current market rate is 300 basis points below the current 
market rate. Bajari et al. (2008) emphasize the role of house price declines and deterioration 
in loan quality. 
Deng et al. (2000) suggests that the borrowing agent would exercise the option in the 
form of a mortgage default if it is in the money where the main determinant is the property 
value. However, the agent would not do this immediately after facing negative home equity 
since property prices may increase in the future. The difference between property value and 
the outstanding loan balance is termed as house equity. A decreasing and eventually negative 
house equity is considered among the main determinants of mortgage defaults in the 
literature. This variable was also addressed in papers predating the crisis, such as Vandell 
(1978) and Campbell and Dietrich (1983). 
More recent research such as Campbell and Cocco (2012) emphasizes additional 
variables and specifications that determined the mortgage decision. According to their 
model, house equity has a triggering effect, however the threshold level for this effect 
depends on the borrowing constraints and other shocks faced by the household in variables 
such as income and inflation. Following the same reasoning, they conclude that the effect of 
these variables would be different for fixed rate mortgage (FRM) and adjustable rate 
mortgage (ARM) contracts. In the case of an ARM contract, an interest rate shock would 
incentivize an agent to default through an increase in borrowing constraints. A high initial 
LTV ratio would make mortgage default more likely since the probability of having low and 
negative home equity would have been increased. The effect of the initial LTV is empirically 
supported by the findings of Mayer et al. (2009) and Schwartz and Torous (2003). However, 
there are also studies arguing that a negative property value does not always translate into a 
default decision. Foote et al. (2008) observe that the rate of default is below 10% for 
homeowners in Massachusetts, U.S. among those experiencing negative house equity. 
Quigley and Order (1990) test the option models for prepayments and find that the extent of 
the prepayment option being in the money has a strong effect, but it is not exercised as 
ruthlessly as the theory predicts. 
3. Methodology 
Analysis of events such as volcano explosions, wars, cancer etc. is important yet hard 
to be perform since such events occur very rarely. That is, we have generally a tiny 
proportion of these events (ones in binary data) in the data set than nonevents (zeros). Early 
termination events such as default and prepayment can also be categorized in this group. 
Our sample has also very few observations of default and prepayment to qualify these 
two cases as rare events. They become further rare when the panel conversion is applied. 
This is shown to create biases and inconsistencies for limited dependent variable 
regressions. Specifically, in probability models, namely logit, serious problems arise due to 
the fact that maximum likelihood estimation of the logistic model suffers from small-sample 
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bias. Here the degree of bias is strongly dependent on the number of cases in the rarer events 
of the two categories of the dependent variable. 
To address this problem, King and Zeng (2001) introduce an adapted version of the 
logistic regression, named rare events logistic regression. This algorithm mainly utilizes the 
method developed by It is essentially a logit regression where all observation on the rare 
cases are coupled with a sample drawn from the non-rare one. The results are unbiased and 
consistent in large samples. 
In their approach, King and Zeng (2001) apply a number of corrections. They firstly 
suggest employing a case-control sampling design using stratified sampling. That is, they 
recommend a random selection of zeros in binary data. Now, the coefficients of explanatory 
variables are approximately unbiased, whereas the constant term may be significantly 
biased. Then, to account this bias, the prior correction method adjusts the constant term. The 
corrected intercept coefficient is: 







where ?̂?0 is uncorrected intercept coefficient, while τ and ?̅? are the fraction of ones in the 
population and the observed fraction of ones in the sample (or sampling probability) 
respectively. 
The slope coefficients are also biased in the sample of rare events data and are 
corrected via: 
?̃? = ?̂? − 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(?̂?)  
where ?̂? refers to the maximum likelihood estimator. So 𝛽 denotes the corrected slope 
coefficients. Here the bias in ?̂? can be estimated by the following weighted least-squares 
expression: 
𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠(?̂?) = (𝛸′Ԝ𝛸)−1𝛸′Ԝ𝜉  
where 𝜉𝑖 = 0.5𝑄𝑖𝑖[(1 + 𝑤1)?̂?𝑖 − 𝑤1], 𝑄𝑖𝑖  are the diagonal elements of 𝑄 = 𝛸(𝛸
′Ԝ𝛸)−1𝛸′, 
and Ԝ = 𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑔{?̂?𝑖(1 − ?̂?𝑖)𝑤𝑖}. Here ?̂?𝑖 denotes the probability of Pr(𝑌𝑖 = 1 | ?̂?) and 𝑤𝑖 =
𝑤1𝑌𝑖 +  𝑤0(1 − 𝑌𝑖) in which 𝑤1 = 𝜏 ?̅?⁄  and 𝑤0 = (1 − 𝜏) (1 − ?̅?)⁄ . 
Then, the outcome we are looking for is to estimate 𝜋 = Pr(𝑌𝑖 = 1 | 𝛽). To do this 
estimation we employ π̃𝑖  = Pr(𝑌𝑖 = 1 | 𝛽) =
1
1+ 𝑒−𝑥𝑖?̃?
 where 𝑥𝑖 is a vector which includes a 
constant and explanatory variables that will be explained in the following section. 
In this study, we employ the approach of King and Zeng (2001) and their STATA 
software package, named “relogit”, developed for the estimation correction model 
mentioned above. Here we apply relogit package with the assumption that early termination 
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choices of credit borrowers are rare events, thus the term “event” corresponds to an 
occurrence of default or prepayment. We compare and verify the results against the standard 
logit regressions as robustness check and support the propositions of King and Zeng (2001). 
4. Data 
In the housing market, having real data is very hard to be obtained especially for the 
data of credits. In the absence of surveys, the only reliable source of individual level data is 
the bank records. The data used in this study is obtained from a large commercial bank 
operating in all regions of Turkey, Garanti Bank. Our dataset covers all mortgage credits 
given by this bank after the introduction of the new legislation June 2007 up to January 2014. 
The data consists of basic information for the credits, namely amount, term, interest 
rate of credit and value of the house, and descriptions for the borrower as follows: income1, 
age, marital status and education level. Information of date and amount for both default and 
prepayment events in a given borrower are also provided. 
The entries are created at the opening of the credit and updated only if refinancing 
option is chosen by the borrower. Hence the dataset is of static nature. Information regarding 
income levels and demographics are obtained as a snapshot of the customer base. This results 
in a mismatch between the income level and marital status variables between the two datasets 
since they are recorded at different points in time. This problem is addressed by using marital 
status change dates and wage indices to correct or approximate the relevant entries. 
Our focus is on the dynamic probabilities of default and prepayment therefore the 
dataset as obtained has little utility for our purposes. To run panel regressions, the dataset 
had to be converted into a panel format. That is, we must convert the data from static to 
dynamic form. We achieve this by taking the initial credit information along with the 
corrected and approximated additions then calculating a series of new variables. For each 
period, the outstanding loan balance (OLB) is calculated. OLB is then used to calculate the 
loan-to-value ratio in period t. Most variables other than demographics are based on these 
two variables. 
The data of credit structure, demographics and key macroeconomic fundamentals 
which we employ as the determinants of early termination events of credit borrowers in a 
given bank are composed of the following variables: 
“Defaulted” and “Prepaid” are dummy variables that register one if the borrower 
defaults or prepays respectively in the current period and zero otherwise. “LTV” stands for 
loan to value ratio and is calculated by dividing the credit amount to the value of the house. 
                                                 
 
 
1 When we were cleaning the data, we found that the income data could not collected very well, so we dropped it 
out from the regression analysis. However, we give basic descriptives of the data to provide an opinion about it. 
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“Prepayment Gain Ratio” is the differential between the total amounts that would be paid 
when the term is completed normally or with a prepayment. It measures how much the 
borrower has to gain from prepayment. “Age of Term” is calculated by dividing the number 
of the current month by the number of total months. Its main role is to test whether borrowers 
are equally likely to default or prepay throughout the term or if they are less likely to default 
in the beginning and towards the end. “Term” stands for the number of months the payments 
will be made to the bank to honor the credit. 
“Age of Customer” is the age of the borrower in the current period. “Education2”, 
“Education3”, “Education4” dummies stand for middle-high school, undergraduate and 
graduate education levels, respectively. “Married” dummy variable controls for the marital 
status with 1 corresponding to be married. “Term Medium” and “Term Long” are dummies 
corresponding to terms of lengths shorter than 60 months, between 60 and 120 months, and 
longer than 120 months, respectively. 
“QE1”, “QE2”, “QE3” are dummy variables that capture the effect of three different 
quantitative easing periods by the Federal Reserve in the U.S. and capture the effect of global 
dynamics. The same goes for “Operation Twist”. The variable of “General Expectations” is 
a catch-all index published by the Central Bank of Turkey to reflect the economical 
expectations regarding near future. “Normalized Real GDP and “Real House Price over 
GDP” are self-explanatory. Real house price component of the latter variable is calculated 
by dividing the Reidin real house price index by the real GDP. “Real FX Rate” is the real 
rate of U.S. dollar to Turkish lira. “Real Mortgage Rate” is the average real mortgage credit 
rate in the market in the current period. 
4.1. Data Description 
In this study, we use credits data which is obtained from a large commercial bank 
operating in all regions of Turkey. This dataset consists of all mortgage credits given by this 
bank from June 2007 to January 2014. As far as we know, this is the biggest dataset used to 
understand Turkish housing credit market. Detailed data descriptions and their sources can 
be found in Table 1. 
Table: 1 





Credit Total amount of mortgage loan in TL Account Basis Garanti Bank 
House Price Value of house subject to given credit in TL Account Basis Garanti Bank 
Term Number of months the payments will be made  Account Basis Garanti Bank 
Mortgage Rate Interest rate subject to given credit at the begining in % Account Basis Garanti Bank 
Income Amount of monthly income of mortgage customer in TL Account Basis Garanti Bank 
Age Age information of mortgage customer  Account Basis Garanti Bank 
Education Education level categorization of mortgage customer  Account Basis Garanti Bank 
Marital Status Marital Status of mortgage customer Account Basis Garanti Bank 
QEs Dummy variables capturing the quantitative easing periods by the Federal Reserve in the U.S. Monthly FED 
General Expectations Catch-all index reflecting economical expectations regarding near future Monthly CBRT 
GDP Gross Domestic Product of Turkey Quarterly TurkStat 
HP Index House Price Index Monthly Reidin 
Real FX Rate Real rate of U.S. dollar to Turkish lira Monthly CBRT 
Mortgage Interes Rate Average mortgage credit rate in the market Monthly CBRT 
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Additionally, basic descriptives for the variables used in our analyses in this study 
are illustrated in Table 2. Original data consists of both credit specific and demographic 
variables. For 186880 mortgage accounts average credit amount is 78,356 TL while average 
LTV ratio is 59% and term is 86 months. Monthly mortgage rate has an avarage of 0.9%. 
Most prominent feature in credit variables is that income and house price have higher 
standard deviations regarding mean values. Looking at the demographic variables, we can 
see that average of mortgage customers’ age is 39, while their education level is averaged 
on high school degree. Finally, the table illustrates that 86% of mortgage customers are 
married. 
Table 2 also provides information about descriptives of both defaulted and prepaid 
customers. Compare to non-defaulted mortgage customers, defaulted ones have more credit 
amount, loan to value ratio and mortgage rate. It also seems that the average income level of 
defaulted customers is double and average value of their house subject to mortgage is higher 
in comparison with other customers. Additional distinctive feature of defaulted mortgage 
owners is that they have lower education level and mariage percentage in average, while 
their age level is slightly higher. When we look at the default specific variables, we can see 
that average period of defaulted credits is the 20th month and the defaulted amount to house 
price ratio is nearly 0.5. 
Table: 2 
Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
Category Variable Group Variable # of observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
All 
Credit Variables 
Credit 186880 78355.88 69641.4 8000 5500000 
LTV 186880 0.592 0.160 0.012 0.799 
Term 186880 85.679 34.388 1 249 
Mortgage Rate 186880 0.008 0.001 0.000 0.018 
Income 186880 4436.463 94799.39 500 3.100 
House Price 186880 139669.2 139319.6 20000 1.100 
Demographic Variables 
Age 186880 38.542 9.970 16 81 
Education 186880 4.330 1.394 0 8 
Married 186880 0.858 0.348 0 1 
Defaulted 
Credit Variables 
Credit 355 95680.86 101696.9 13645 1100000 
LTV 355 0.663 0.125 0.023 0.797 
Term 355 85.157 35.822 4 240 
Mortage Rate 355 0.009 0.001 0.005 0.015 
Income 355 9961.346 79730.65 656 1500000 
House Price 355 150169.6 177583.9 26000 1800000 
Demographic Variables 
Age 355 39.256 8.785 21 64 
Education 355 4.011 1.246 2 7 
Married 355 0.783 0.412 0 1 
Default Specific Variables 
Defaulted Period 355 20.363 8.898 4 41 
Defaulted Amount 355 77425.52 79535.15 1386.97 797595.1 
Prepaid 
Credit Variables 
Credit 18157 80580.32 83130.05 10000 2600000 
LTV 18157 0.579 0.164 0.062 0.799 
Term 18157 73.272 32.678 5 240 
Mortgage Rate 18157 0.009 0.001 0.002 0.018 
Income 18157 4566.2 8486.72 500 503000 
House Price 18157 144109.9 155275.4 20000 5382000 
Demographic Variables 
Age 18157 39.801 9.423 19 79 
Education 18157 4.554 1.409 0 8 
Married 18157 0.859 0.347 0 1 
Prepayment Specific Variables 
Prepaid Period 18157 23.359 10.913 1 77 
Prepaid Amount 18157 54330 64456.02 899.37 2173269 
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Prepaid customers’ differences compared to others in term of average levels can also 
be seen in the table. The values in the table illustrate that prepaid customers’ average levels 
of credit amount, mortgage rate, income and value of the house become higher, but the LTV 
ratio becomes shorter in comparison with other customers. Furthermore, average values of 
all demogaphic descriptives of customers using prepayment option are barely higher than 
others. We can also reach that the average period of prepayment is beyond 3 months 
compared to the default situtation. Finally, the prepaid amount is nearly two thirds of the 
defaulted amount and 40% of house value is subject to credit used by prepaid customers. 
5. Results 
The results are grouped in under default and prepayment categories based on the 
dependent variable. The results of rare events logistic regression analysis for the default and 
prepayment cases can be seen in Table 3 and 4 respectively. To interpret the coefficients in 
these tables, Table 5 provides the probability changes in level and return for initial analyses 
of both the default and prepayment cases. Firstly, the probability of default part will be 
examined. 
5.1. Probability of Default 
The initial regression in Table 3 controls for the real FX rate (USD/TRY). Probability 
of default increases with the LTV. This is an expected result and consistent with the 
literature. Borrowers who have high loan to value ratio are more likely to experience 
difficulties in mortgage payments compared to a low loan to value ratio since higher LTV 
expresses that mortgage borrowers have less down payment and high debt (loan) burden. 
According to Table 5, based on our initial default regression model results, about 10% rise 
in the mean value of LTV ratio causes the probability of default to increase by 1.195%. 
The age of the mortgage contract has an effect: it is less likely for a borrower to 
default at the initial and final months of payment. The likelihood of default is locally 
maximized when 62% of the term is reached, e.g. probability of default is maximized on the 
74th month for a 120-month contract. This is an important finding in the sense that it gives 
valuable signals to mortgage creditors about the timing of default risk. 
Only the second quantitative easing dummy has a significant effect. The default 
probability was lowered by the second quantitative easing. Operational twist on the other 
hand has a larger negative effect with a better p-value. The age of the borrower increases the 
probability of default in a concave manner where it peaks at about 41 years, then drops. 
Education does not have a significant effect unless the borrower attended high school and 
above. More educated borrowers have a lower chance of default. The length of term affects 
default probability. Long term credits have a positive effect on default whereas middle term 
credits have a negative effect on default. Better expectations about the future reduces the 
probability of default. This result is also consistent with the strategic default literature in 
which borrowers strategically choose to not pay when he or she realizes that the real housing 
price will fall. 
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Additionally, the ratio of real house prices to GDP has a negative effect, implying 
that default is less likely if the real value of houses is growing faster than the economy. 
The second regression in Table 3 eliminates the FX rate from the equation and reruns 
it. When the real FX rate is excluded QE3 and normalized GDP gain significance. In other 
words, they are not significant when the FX rate is controlled for. This is not surprising, 
given the sensitivity of the real FX rate in Turkey to FED decisions and how dependent GDP 
is on it. There are no sign changes between the results with and without the real FX rate. 
We divide the sample in two, based on whether the observation is made during or 
after the crisis. Surprisingly, the intercept term loses statistical significance. The magnitude 
of the age and age-squared terms remain the same, but their p-values change, probably due 
to the lowered sample size. 
Being married also significantly reduces the probability of default. Based on our 
initial results, married mortgage borrowers have about 1% lower likelihood of default 
compared to single borrowers. 
Dividing the sample in two based on the initial LTV ratio shows that credits with a 
high LTV ratio are more sensitive to the real house price over GDP variable. The effects of 
LTV and age terms are not statistically significant when initial LTV is low. 
Finally, dividing the sample based on credit amount suggests that the intercept is not 
significant for the medium and large-scale credits. The magnitude of the intercept is higher 
for the small-scale credits. This signals that small-scale credits have an exceptionally high 
default rate to begin with. Age terms lose significance in the small and large-scale credit 
cases. 
5.2. Probability of Prepayment 
Our regression analysis about prepayment can be seen in Table 4. The age of 
mortgage has a concave effect on prepayment probability. The maximum effect is observed 
when the 60% of the term is passed. QE1 and QE3 are significant whereas QE2 is not. This 
is completely the inverse of the case of default. The first and the third quantitative easing 
periods affected the probability of prepayment whereas the second one did the same for 
defaults. The first easing resulted in an increase in prepayments whereas the third one in a 
decrease. The magnitudes are offsetting each other, suggesting that the end outcome from 
the perspective of the banks was neutralized. Operational twist had a negative effect on 
prepayment probability as it did on default probability. Better expectations of future 
economic conditions have a positive effect on prepayments so does the size of real GDP and 
real house prices over GDP. 
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Rare Events Logistic Regressions for the Case of Default 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































# of Observations 3980306 3980306 1743875 2236431 1223409 2756897 1440007 1914548 625751 
Note: *** (significant at 1% level); ** (significant at 5% level); * (significant at 10% level). The numbers into 
parenthesis show the P-values. 
The FX rate has a negative effect on prepayments suggesting that people are less 
likely to prepay as dollar goes up. The age of the borrower is not statistically significant. 
Age-squared is significant but with an extremely low magnitude. Education only has a 
significant effect for individuals with a high school degree and below, implying they are 
more likely to prepay than university graduates and people with little or no education. 
Married borrowers are less likely to prepay. The likelihood of prepayment increases as the 
term lengthens. 
Prepayment probability also depends on the prepayment gain ratio which captures 
the relative gain in prepayment. Replacing the short, medium and long-term dummies with 
non-linear term variables do not change the results. The length of term has a negative 
significant effect whereas non-linear terms have near-zero magnitudes albeit being 
significant. The second version of this regression replaces the prepayment gain ratio with 
the interest rate of the contract and real mortgage interest rate. Expectations of the future 
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loses significance, signaling that expectations are already embedded in the real mortgage 
interest rate on the market. QE1 and QE3 suffers magnitude loss. Operational twist, real FX 
rate and term lengths change signs. Excluding the real FX rate does not change the results 
as it did in the default case. 
Table: 4 
Rare Events Logistic Regressions for the Case of Prepayment 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































# of Observations 3980306 3980306 3980306 1743875 2236431 1223409 2756897 1440007 1914548 625751 
Note: *** (significant at 1% level); ** (significant at 5% level); * (significant at 10% level). The numbers into 
parenthesis show the P-values. 
Dividing the sample in two for the crisis and post crisis periods suggest that the 
second quantitative easing had a positive effect during the crisis and a negative one 
afterwards. The size of the GDP has no effect in the post-crisis period. Demographic 
variables of age and education were not significant during the crisis, but they became so in 
the post-crisis months. 
Separating the low and high initial LTV borrowers suggest that education only has 
an effect when the credit has high initial LTV. Curiously, this only pertains to the ratio of 
the LTV and not to the amount of actual credit. 
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First Difference and Relative Risk of Probabilities for Deafult and Prepayment 
Default Prepayment 
 
First Difference (Change 
in Probability, %) 
Relative Risk (Return 
in Probability, %) 
 
First Difference (Change 
in Probability, %) 
Relative Risk (Return 
in Probability, %) 




Age of Term 0.001 1.191 Age of Term 0.031 1.110 
Age of Term - 
Squared 
-0.000 0.947 
















Real FX Rate -0.001 0.754 Real FX Rate -0.052 0.817 
QE1 -0.002 0.644 QE1 0.412 2.476 
QE2 -0.002 0.570 QE2 -0.000 1.001 
QE3 0.001 1.194 QE3 -0.281 0.378 
Operation Twist -0.003 0.497 Operation Twist -0.138 0.571 
Age of Customer 0.003 1.608 Age of Customer 0.006 1.020 
Age of Customer - 
Squared 
-0.001 0.784 
Age of Customer - 
Squared 
-0.005 0.981 
Education2 0.001 1.115 Education2 0.024 1.086 
Education3 -0.004 0.439 Education3 0.029 1.102 
Education4 -0.004 0.278 Education4 0.017 1.061 
Married -0.007 0.411 Married -0.048 0.852 
Term Medium -0.002 0.731 Term Medium 0.039 1.151 
Term Long 0.013 3.163 Term Long 0.197 1.710 
Note: First Difference indicates the amount of increase or decrease, while Relative Risk gives the percentage change 
in the probability of each early termination case with respect to 10% increase from mean values for given variable. 
For dummy variables, the values in the table are calculated by changing the to 1 from 0. All the values at the table 
are reached via “relogitq” command in Stata. 
Dividing the sample based on credit scale shows that education only has an effect 
when the credit is medium-scale except for higher education. The observed effect of 
education on the medium scale credits is positive. Age only has a negative effect on 
prepayment for small-scale credits and a positive one in medium scale credits. The long-
term credit dummy loses its significance in the large-scale credit case. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Our study aims to highlight the patterns and relationship observed between defaults 
and prepayments and other relevant variables in the Turkish mortgage market through an 
analysis of commercial data. The methods we develop aims to use available static data by 
converting it into a panel format since most of the credits have not reached their maturity. 
By doing so, we can determine not only if a borrower will default but also predict 
when it is most likely to happen. We also include dummy variables for FED policies to show 
how an emerging market would depend on international conditions. Our dynamic 
regressions suggest that default is positively affected by a high loan to value ratio, age of the 
borrower, length of term and negatively affected by certain quantitative easing periods, 
operational twist, and a high school and above education level, good expectations regarding 
the future and the ratio of real house prices to the size of the economy. The likelihood of 
default is locally maximized when 62% of the term is reached. Prepayment is positively 
affected by the prepayment gain ratio, the first quantitative easing, an education level of high 
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school and above, the size of the GDP, the ratio of real house prices to GDP and negatively 
affected by the third quantitative easing period, operational twist, real FX rate and marriage. 
Probability of prepayment is maximized around 60% of the term. The significance and 
magnitude of coefficients in both default and prepayment regressions slightly change when 
the sample is divided based on credit scale, initial LTV and crisis periods. 
Our findings about the Turkish mortgage market are crucial in the sense that it gives 
valuable signals to mortgage creditors about the timing of default risk and prepayment 
behaviours. Also, this study creates useful ground for a better understanding of the default 
and prepayment attitudes by examining the impacts of macroeconomic and demographic 
variables. Hopefully, we aim to enlarge this study by focusing on different dataset and 
various emerging economies. 
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